Regionalism, cabinet stability and Canada's electoral system: the effect of district magnitude

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  • Additional Information
    • Publication Information:
      Canadian Political Science Association
    • Publication Date:
      1996
    • Subject Terms:
    • Abstract:
      Previous literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.
    • ISSN:
      0008-4239
    • Rights:
      Copyright 1996 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.
      COPYRIGHT 1996 Canadian Political Science Association
    • Accession Number:
      edsgcl.19082515
  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      SUTHERLAND, N. Regionalism, cabinet stability and Canada’s electoral system: the effect of district magnitude. Canadian Journal of Political Science, [s. l.], n. 3, p. 497, 1996. Disponível em: . Acesso em: 18 ago. 2019.
    • AMA:
      Sutherland N. Regionalism, cabinet stability and Canada’s electoral system: the effect of district magnitude. Canadian Journal of Political Science. 1996;(3):497. http://ezproxy.parker.edu/login?url={targeturl}. Accessed August 18, 2019.
    • APA:
      Sutherland, N. (1996). Regionalism, cabinet stability and Canada’s electoral system: the effect of district magnitude. Canadian Journal of Political Science, (3), 497. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.parker.edu/login?url={targeturl}
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Sutherland, Neil. 1996. “Regionalism, Cabinet Stability and Canada’s Electoral System: The Effect of District Magnitude.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, no. 3: 497. http://ezproxy.parker.edu/login?url={targeturl}.
    • Harvard:
      Sutherland, N. (1996) ‘Regionalism, cabinet stability and Canada’s electoral system: the effect of district magnitude’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, (3), p. 497. Available at: http://ezproxy.parker.edu/login?url={targeturl} (Accessed: 18 August 2019).
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Sutherland, N 1996, ‘Regionalism, cabinet stability and Canada’s electoral system: the effect of district magnitude’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, no. 3, p. 497, viewed 18 August 2019, .
    • MLA:
      Sutherland, Neil. “Regionalism, Cabinet Stability and Canada’s Electoral System: The Effect of District Magnitude.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, no. 3, 1996, p. 497. EBSCOhost, ezproxy.parker.edu/login?url={targeturl}.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Sutherland, Neil. “Regionalism, Cabinet Stability and Canada’s Electoral System: The Effect of District Magnitude.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, no. 3 (1996): 497. http://ezproxy.parker.edu/login?url={targeturl}.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Sutherland N. Regionalism, cabinet stability and Canada’s electoral system: the effect of district magnitude. Canadian Journal of Political Science [Internet]. 1996 [cited 2019 Aug 18];(3):497. Available from: http://ezproxy.parker.edu/login?url={targeturl}